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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to U.C.A. Sections 35-1-82.53 (1988), 35-1-86 
(1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 14 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
KLEINSMITH'S INDUSTRIAL INJURY DID NOT RESULT IN A 
PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY. 
II. WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN REFUSING TO REFER 
THE CASE TO A MEDICAL PANEL 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This Court's review of the decision of the Industrial 
Commission is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989). Because Kleinsmith 
challenges the Commission's findings of fact, arguing that the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the appli-
cable section of the UAPA is 63-46b-16(4)(g). Under this section, 
an agency's factual findings will be affirmed "only if they are 
'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court.'" Tasters Ltd. v. Dept. of 
Employment Security, 222 UAR 63, 65 (Filed September 24, 1993), 
citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (9 
Utah App. 19 89). 
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The substantial evidence test mandates that the party 
challenging the factual findings must marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence 
given the record as a whole. Id. 
Kleinsmith also suggests that the Administrative Law Judge 
misapplied the law in determining the cause of his disability and 
in refusing to refer the matter to a medical panel. The standard 
of review utilized depends on the existence of a statutory grant 
of discretion to the agency. Tasters, supra. citing Morton 
Int'l. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 583-89 (Utah 
1991). Where there is a grant of discretion to the agency, the 
agency is entitled to a degree of deference such that it should 
be affirmed if its decision is reasonable and rational." 
Tasters, supra, citing Wagstaff v. Department of Employment Sec, 
826 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statute in this case is 35-1-77 (1) (a), 
Utah Code Annotated. Rules 568-1-9 and 568-1-17(c) of the 
Industrial Commission's Administrative Rules are also applicable. 
Copies of the statute and rules are set forth in the Addendum as 
Exhibit A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants Allied Van Lines and Gulf Insurance Company adopt 
Kleinsmith's Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Allied Van Lines and Gulf Insurance Company 
generally adopt Kleinsmith's Statement of Facts but point out 
that Mr, Kleinsmith's second heart attack, on May 11, 1991, was 
not simultaneous with receipt of word from his occupational 
health insurance carrier that his neck surgery would not be 
covered. In fact, the heart attack occurred three weeks 
following receipt of the letter denying coverage. (R. 427) 
Following Mr. Kleinsmith's five vessel coronary bypass 
operation on June 12, 1984, he was off work for about a year, not 
a few months (R. 43 0); and then suffered another industrial 
injury on July 30, 1989, when he fell off a six-foot ladder onto 
his back and neck and injured his heel. He was off work four or 
five weeks after that fall. (R. 400-404) 
On July 8, 1991, Dr. Church indicated that Mr. Kleinsmith 
would be totally disabled from his neck alone for another six 
weeks, (R. 342) and assigned a 20% permanent partial disability 
rating (R. 341); then on September 26, 1991 he opined that Mr. 
Kleinsmith was permanently, totally disabled because of his age 
and his recent myocardial infarction. (R. 343) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding 
that there is no causal connection between Mr. Kleinsmith's 
October 31, 1990 industrial injury and a determination of 
permanent, total disability. The medical records of Kleinsmith's 
treating physicians support such a finding. 
Applicant relies on medical reports obtained and submitted 
after the hearing and also relies on a letter from the Social 
Security Administration dated May 26, 1992, six and one-half 
weeks following the hearing, to argue that Kleinsmith's 
industrial injury might also be a factor in his Social Security 
Disability Determination, had it only been considered. 
Substantial evidence need not be uncontradicted evidence. A 
determination of permanent total disability is a question of 
fact, and the findings of the ALJ have not exceeded the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality and should not be disturbed. 
The Administrative Law Judge is granted statutory discretion 
in referring medical issues to a medical panel and the facts of 
this case do not call for a mandatory referral. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
MR. KLEINSMITH'S INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DID NOT 
RESULT IN PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY 
The applicant asserts that the medical and testimonial 
evidence in the record supports his contention that the 
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industrial accident of October 31, 1990, rendered him permanently 
and totally disabled due to his back condition. He asserts that 
his social security disability benefits were awarded solely on 
the basis of his coronary condition because the Social Security 
Administration did not consider his back condition when they made 
the award, and that the ALJ simply adopted those findings to deny 
his claim. 
The ALJ noted that the applicant's heart condition was not 
industrially related and that he was awarded social security 
disability solely on the basis of his non-industrial heart 
condition. (R. 109) She also noted that his cervical problems 
were, at best, due to a combination of industrial as well as pre-
existing causes, and that the issue before the Commission was 
whether or not the October 1990 industrial injury was a signifi-
cant cause of Kleinsmith's permanent and total disability status. 
(R. 110) 
A determination of permanent total disability is a question 
of fact. Kerans v. Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 
19 85). There is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the ALJ's determination that the applicant is not permanently and 
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident of 
October 31, 1990. 
The industrial injury of October 31, 1990 must be a 
"dominant" or "significant" cause of Kleinsmith's disability in 
order to find permanent and total disability as a result thereof. 
-5-
Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). 
There is absolutely no medical evidence in the record to support 
such a claim, even if the letters and records obtained and sub-
mitted by Kleinsmith after the hearing are considered. 
Dr. Church, a neurologist who treated Mr. Kleinsmith for his 
cervical problems, did not solely attribute Kleinsmith's back and 
neck problems to his industrial injury of October 31, 1990, but 
nevertheless gave him a 20% disability rating following his neck 
surgery. This is not a permanent, total disability. In a subse-
quent visit, Dr. Church opined that Kleinsmith was unable to work 
due to his age and myocardial infarction. (R. 343). 
Dr. Redd stated that Kleinsmith had pre-existing coronary 
artery disease and that he ". . . probably had gradual 
progression of his coronary artery disease and likely had some 
recurrent stenosis and occlusions of the bypass grafts placed 6 
years ago. This combination with moderately elevated blood 
pressure likely resulted in his heart attack." (R. 353). Dr. 
Redd gave Mr. Kleinsmith an overall impairment rating of 65% of 
the whole person (R. 358), considerably more than the 20% rating 
attributed by Dr. Church for cervical problems. 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook reviewed the medical records at the 
request of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, observing that "the 
pathology in the cervical spine was preexisting. The first 
accident in July or August 1989 precipitated it to a symptomatic 
standpoint from which it never recovered." (R. 69) Dr. Holbrook 
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concluded that the industrial accident did not specifically cause 
any identifiable pathological process and that it did not appear 
that any of the permanent impairment should be ascribed to the 
fall of October 31, 1990 as the ultimate surgery was inevitable. 
(R. 70) 
Kleinsmith relies on a letter from Dr. Albrand, whom 
Kleinsmith did not even see until several weeks after the hear-
ing. By his own admission, Dr. Albrand did not review all of the 
records, but relied solely on history taken from Mr. Kleinsmith. 
(R.133) Judge Church weighed the evidence, as she has the 
discretion to do, and apparently relied on the reports of 
Kleinsmith's longstanding heart doctor, Edward Redd; and the 
reports of Mr. Kleinsmith7s treating physician for his neck and 
back complaints, Dr. Glen Church, and gave the other reports the 
weight they deserved. 
The letter from the Social Security Administration, written 
over six weeks after the hearing, but which Kleinsmith suggests 
the ALJ relied on, does clarify that the Social Security 
Determination was based on the records of Dr. Redd, a cardiolo-
gist. The records of Dr. Church were not considered, apparently 
because Kleinsmith himself did not submit them for whatever 
reason. Nevertheless, the statement by the SSI Operations 
Supervisor that "it may well be that he could have qualified for 
SSI benefits upon those [neck/back/upper extremities] problems as 
well". (R. 72) This does not rise to the level of a "dominant" 
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or "significant" cause or that of substantial evidence. To 
speculate that Kleinsmith's cervical problems may have been the 
basis for an SSI disability is simply that--speculation. 
The Industrial Accident Division's rules on permanent total 
disability require that the ALJ determine "if a significant cause 
of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident or some 
other unrelated cause or causes." U.A.C. R568-1-17(C) (1992); 
See Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 
1988). A review of the entire record fails to show a causal 
connection between the industrial accident of October 31, 1990 
and a finding of permanent, total disability. 
Kleinsmith suffered from arthritic and degenerative condi-
tions in his cervical spine prior to the accident of October 31, 
1990. Dr. Albrand asserted that there is a causal connection 
between the October 1990 accident and the applicant's disability, 
but failed to discuss the extent of that disability in relation 
to the applicant's pre-existing conditions or the significance of 
that disability in relation to Kleinsmith's overall health. All 
of the doctors who examined the applicant discussed his disabil-
ity from his neck and coronary conditions, but none of them 
attempted to relate the various disabilities to a specific indus-
trial or non-industrial cause. There is no competent medical 
evidence which shows that the applicant's cervical problems are a 
"significant" cause of his disability, or even that his cervical 
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problems were solely caused by his industrial accident; in fact, 
the evidence is to the contrary. 
Kleinsmith has failed to completely satisfy his obligation 
to marshal the evidence by persistently arguing his own position 
without regard for the evidence supporting the ALJ's findings. 
This Court should thus decline to disturb the findings made by 
the ALJ and ratified by the Industrial Commission. 
POINT II. 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HAD NO OBLIGA-
TION TO SUBMIT THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL 
Reference to the medical panel is controlled by statute. In 
1982, the legislature amended U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 and changed 
the requirement of a mandatory referral to the medical panel to a 
permissive referral. Hone v. J.F. Shea Company, 728 P.2d 1008, 
1012 (Utah 1986). 
The Administrative Law Judge did not abuse her statutory 
discretion in refusing to refer this matter to a medical panel. 
Kleinsmith suggests that reference to a medical panel is manda-
tory under Rule R568-1-9, and that the failure to do so is plain 
error. He relies on the rationale of old Utah cases interpreting 
the former mandatory referral statute. 
The criteria outlined in R568-1-9 for referral to a medical 
panel deal with controversies of degree of disability, period of 
disability and medical expenses. The criteria does not include 
an issue as to medical causation. 
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The statute clearly leaves to the discretion of the Administra-
tive Law Judge the determination of whether to refer to a medical 
panel after review of the evidence, including applicant's testi-
mony, medical records and other documents. 
The ALJ, not the medical panel, is responsible for making 
the actual decision regarding medical causation. Intermountain 
Health v. Bd, of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1992). In 
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 703 P.2d 
306 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that in some 
cases, such as where the evidence of causal connection between 
the work-related event and the injury is uncertain or highly 
technical, failure to refer the case to a medical panel may be an 
abuse of discretion. Id. at 308. However, on the facts of 
Champion the court found no abuse of discretion. Similarly, 
there is no uncertainty or highly technical issue in this case 
and the ALJ in this case did not abuse her discretion in relying 
on the substantial evidence presented at the hearing in deter-
mining that the medical causation of Kleinsmith's permanent, 
total disability was his myocardial infarction. The fact that 
the applicant disagrees with the ALJ's finding does not create an 
uncertainty. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the 
findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and ratified by the 
Industrial Commission. 
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DATED this fQ day of December, 1993. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ((MUJL JW&44AC<<^ 
Anne Swensen 
Attorneys for Respondents Allied 
Van Lines and Gulf Insurance 
Company 
07741.327\Brief 
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WORKERS* COMPENSATION 35-1-77 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con-
sultants — Discretionary authority of commis-
sion to refer case — Findings and reports — Ob-
jections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical 
Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commis-
sion adopts the following guidelines in determining 
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must 
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues axe involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physi-
cal impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the tempo-
rary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may 
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel 
report. Where there is a proffer of new written con-
flicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law 
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new 
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarifica-
tion. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize 
an injured worker to be examined by another physi-
cian for the purpose of obtaining a further medical 
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical 
issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing 
these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medi-
cal panel or medical consultant and of their appear-
ance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further 
medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the 
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
R568-1-17. Permanent Total Disability. 
A. The Commission is required under Section 
35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of total disability 
as measured by the substance of the sequential deci-
sion-making process of the Social Security Adminis-
tration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, as revised. The use of the term "substance of 
the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to 
confer some latitude on the Commission in exercising 
a degree of discretion in making its findings relative 
to permanent total disability. The Commission does 
not interpret the code section to eliminate the re-
quirement that a finding by the Commission in per-
manent and total disability shall in all cases be tenta-
tive and not final until rehabilitation training and/or 
evaluation has been accomplished. 
B. In the event that the Social Security Adminis-
tration or its designee has made, or is in the process 
of making, a determination of disability under the 
foregoing process, the Commission may use this infor-
mation in lieu of instituting the process on its own 
behalf. 
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the in-
jured worker has qualified for Social Security disabil-
ity benefits, the Commission will determine if a sig-
nificant cause of the disability is the claimant's in-
dustrial accident or some other unrelated cause or 
causes. 
